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RECENT DECISIONS
include invasion of incorporeal interests. Jay Bee Apparel Stores, Inc. v. 563-564
Main Street Realty Co. 130 Misc. 23, 223 N. Y. S. 537 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd. 226 App.
Div. 721, 233 N. Y. S. 792 (4th Dept. 1927), and more specifically to include
tortious invasions of contract rights, Buyers v. Buffalo Paint & Specialties Co.
- Misc. -, 99 N. Y. S. 2nd 713 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
In the instant case, the court interpreted the term "personal property" so as
not to include intangible or incorporeal interests. The reason advanced was
the absence of a precedent. However, it might well be that the true determinant
was public policy: the fear of making malicious invasions of such intangible per-
sonal property as business reputation, good-will, contract rights, etc., a criminal
offense; but this fear is unfounded because the intent element of the tort action
(malice in law) differs from the intent element of the crime (malice in fact).
Another factor might be the fear of making the award of damages, already a
matter of speculation when injury to intangibles is involved, a mechanism of
oppression and abuse when trebled.
Robert C. Schaus
SALES-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF PERSONALTY-EFFECT OF
UNIFORM SALES ACT
Louis O'Disho, a peach grower, contracted to sell all peaches to be grown
by him for a period of five years to Hunt Foods, Inc. The purchase price was
to be the average price paid by the canner to other growers in that county in the
current season of delivery. When O'Disho refused to deliver after the first year
the canner brought suit for specific-performance under section 1788 of the Civil
Code of California, (Uniform Sales Act, sec. 68.) Held: the contract was specifi-
cally enforceable; that, "By its enactment of this section the legislature unquestion-
ably had in mind the liberalization of the law regarding specific performance of
contracts for the sale of chattels." Hunt Foods, Inc. v. O'Disho et al., 98 F. Supp.
267 (N. D. CaL 1951).
Specific performance was established as a remedy for breach of contract in
the early history of Anglo-American jurisprudence. It was meant to supple-
ment the legal remedy of damages and was decreed only where the money damages
would not be adequate compensation. It was not decreed as a matter "of right
but only in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, subject to fixed rules and
legal principles. Rogers v. Challis, 27 Beav. 175, 57 Eng. Rep. 68 (1859); Re-
statement, Contracts, sections 358, 359 (1932); 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence,
sec. 1401 (5th Ed. 1941); 31 Halsbury's Laws of England, 329, et. seq. (2nd Ed.
1938). Where specific performance has been made a statutory remedy these
principal features have been preserved. Section 68 of the Uniform Sales Act, es-
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sentially a copy of the English Sale of Goods Act of 1893, 56 & 57 Vict., c. 71,
sec. 52, provides, . . . "Where a seller has broken a contract to deliver specific
or ascertained goods, a court having the powers of a court of equity may, if it
thinks fit, ... direct that the contract shall be performed specifically... " 1A
Uniform Laws Annotated, sec. 68.
Before the statutes, the courts generally refused to extend equitable jurisdic-
tion to a contract for the sale of personal property. They held the view that
damages at law, calculated on the market price, were as complete a remedy, in
the case of chattels, as specific delivery. With the money damages awarded a
purchaser could go into the market and buy a like thing in like quantity. Adderly
v. Dixon, 1 Sim. & St. 607, 57 Eng.Rep. 239 (1824); Corbin v. Tracy, 34 Conn.
325 (1867); Pomeroy, supra, sec. 1402. This attitude is still manifest in some
jurisdictions in interpreting the statute. In New York a buyer was denied
specific performance of a contract for the sale of scarce tobacco. In sending him
back to the trial court for a determination of the adequacy of money damages
the Appellate Division held the statute to be a codification of the Common
Law. In exercising its discretion, the court said, due regard must be given the
spirit of the decided cases, and where money damages will substantially compen-
sate specific performance should be denied. Glick v. Beer, 263 App. Div. 599,
33 N. Y. S. 2d 833 (1st Dept. 1942). (For a similiar view of the English
statute see, In re wait, [1927] 1 Ch. 606, where the contract involved a shipment
of grain.)
The principal case is an illustration of the extent to which the traditional
view has been modified in this country. There is a definite tendency in some
jurisdictions to increase the number of cases in which the remedy is available
by liberalizing its requirements. Restatement, Contracts, sec. 358 (1932);
Williston, Contracts, sec. 1419, (Rev. Ed. 1937). Williston also points out that
this modern trend brings our law more in harmony with the Civil Law where
the remedy is freely granted when deemed the most effective relief. Williston,
supra, sec. 1418. Typical of the modern view is Bomberger v. McKelvey, 35
Cal. 2d 607, 220 P. 2d 729 (1950); cited by the court in the instant case, where
it was held that a contract involving scarce building materials was specifically
enforceable. The court determined that the intent of the legislature in adopting
the Sales Act was to liberalize the requirements for specific performance of con-
tracts for the sale or transfer of chattels.
It might be said that the liberal view has developed in spite of the require-
ment that the goods be specific or ascertained. This prerequisite probably came
from the early notion that specific performance was to be granted only where
the buyer had suffered a hardship in respect of certain goods; the unique goods
idea. Why the statute demands that the goods be ascertained is not so easily
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understood. See in re Wait, supra, 639. In New York the latter stipulation has
actually operated as a bar to equitable jurisdiction without consideration of the
basic issue of adequacy of the legal remedy. Where buyers sought specific per-
formance of contracts made to insure delivery of a new car in the tight market
which followed World War II it was held to be fatal that the contracts did not
specify a certain car at the time they were drawn. The bills were dismissed on
that ground alone. Cohen v. Rosenstock Motors, Inc., 188 Misc. 426, 65 N. Y. S.
2d 481 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Goodman v. Henry Caplan, Inc., 188 Misc. 242, 65 N.
Y. S. 2d 581 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Gellis v. Fulsom Buick Co., 191 Misc. 566 (Sup.
Ct. 1947).
There are indications however, that where the liberal attitude prevails the
specific or ascertained clause is being relegated to a position of minor importance.
In Pittenger Equipment Co. v. Tiber Structures, Inc., 217 P. 2d 770 (Ore. 1950),
a shipment of lumber was held to be specific or ascertained goods within the
meaning of the statute since it was to serve a specified purpose, i. e. settlement
of an insolvent debtor's account. Further evidence of the de-emphasis of this
requirement is found in the rephrasing of section 68 in the new Uniform Corn-
mercial Code, sec. 2-716, (Proposed Final Draft, Spring, 1950). The clause has
been completely omitted in the new section which was formulated with the ex-
press purpose of pr6moting the liberal view.
I proclaiming the modern view the court in the instant case is still far
from Story's position which allowed that no reasonable objection could be raised
to giving the buyer his election. 2 Story, Equity Jurisprudence, sec. 717a, (13th
Ed. 1886). On the other hand it does mark fulfillment of Williston's hope that
the statutes would dispose the courts to grant the remedy more often, and thus
increase the number of cases in which the ends of justice may be served. Willis-
ton, Sales, sec. 601, (Rev. Ed. 1948). As the Commissioners of the Commercial
Code point our, the demands of the commercial world today make it necessary
that the courts eschew the traditional attitude toward specific performance. That
this can be accomplished without departing from the long established rules is
exemplified by the instant case. It aflirms the ability of equity to expand to meet
new and changing situations without sacrificing its basic principles.
Joseph C. Tisdall
